A decentralized secure protocol for casting trust rating in reputation systems (StR protocol) is lately proposed by Dimitriou and Michalas, and the StR protocol is verified to be faster than the previous work providing anonymous feedback. In this letter, we present new enhanced scheme of StR. Compared with StR protocol, our new approach attains the exactly same security, but requires less processing time and about half communication overheads. Therefore, we improve the performance without sacrificing any security, especially the communication delay is dramatically reduced.
Introduction
With the prosperous development of online communities, reputation systems [1] have been widely adopted to assist users to avoid interacting with untrustworthy or unreliable nodes. In reputation systems, the behavior of an entity is evaluated according to the quality of service he provided. The reputation systems utilize the feedback information as the evidence, then aggregate other users' feedback to decide whether one entity is reliable.
Nevertheless, the users may not provide genuine feedback due to some realistic reasons, such as worrying about possible retaliation [2] . For the problem, an obvious solution is that the feedbacks are provided in anonymous or privacy-preserving manner such that nobody apart from the provider can learn the recommended information. In recent years, several works [3] - [6] have addressed the privacy concerns of feedback providers in decentralized environments where no trusted authority exists. The paper [3] proposed three protocols to protect privacy of feedback in decentralized additive reputation system, but the schemes can resist the collusion attack of (n − 1) users with only a certain probability at best. Here, n is the number of feedback providers. Hasan et al. [4] presented another privacy-preserving protocol in which each user splits his private vote into k shares (k < n−1), selects k trustworthy agents, and sends one share to each selected agent. The accumulated protocol (AP) and weighted accumulated protocol (WAP) are put forward by [5] to compute trust in a completely distributed manner. The schemes in [5] only require the transmission of O(n) messages, but the length of one message is as big as O(n). Besides, the computation cost of them is inefficiently high. Dimitriou and Michalas [6] lately proposed an efficient multiparty trust computation approach (StR) in decentralized environments such as ad hoc networks. StR is proven to be secure against the collusion of querying node and at most k < (n − 1) users out of the feedback providers. Their implementation results show the communication delay of StR is about 11% of that of the protocol in [5] . Through using the zero-knowledge proofs [7] , the work [6] In this letter, we analyze the efficient lately proposed scheme -StR [6] , and observe that a higher efficiency can be achieved without sacrificing any security. Using the random splitting approach, we present a new secure reputation approach in decentralized environment. Our scheme can attain the same security with StR, that is, it can resist the collusion attack of querying node and at most k < (n − 1) feedback providers. Compared to StR, our new approach requires less computation cost, and decreases communication overheads by 50% or so. We achieve the performance improvements through analyzing the splitting approach and eliminating the computation and communication redundancy in StR. Our proposed scheme only considers the semi-honest adversaries model, but it can be easily converted into an equivalent protocol resisting malicious adversaries by making use of the zero-knowledge proofs [7] . The converting manner is similar to that for extending StR into StR M , thus, this letter restricts our attention to only the semi-honest adversaries model.
The rest of the letter is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the problem and adversaries model, then reviews and discusses the StR protocol. In Sect. 3, we propose our new secure reputation scheme, followed by analysis and comparison with StR. At last, Sect. 4 concludes the letter.
Problem Statement and Our Discussion of Dimitriou et al.'s StR Protocol

Problem Statement and Adversaries Model
Problem Statement: Concretely speaking, this letter deals with the following situation: A querying user A q has no
Copyright c 2014 The Institute of Electronics, Information and Communication Engineers enough information about a target node A t . Then, A q selects the node set U = {U 1 , U 2 , · · · , U n }, and asks each node U i to provide his feedback (v i ) about A t . The challenging problem is that A q would like to obtain the aggregated feedback sum ( n i=1 v i ) while no node wants his feedback to be learned by others. That is, v i should be kept privately to U i throughout the reputation evaluation. The feedback v i in this problem is also called the vote of U i . In this letter, we use feedback and vote interchangeably.
Adversaries Model: During the reputation evaluation, the participants (querying user and feedback providers) in our scheme are assumed to be semi-honest, a.k.a., honestbut-curious. Under the semi-honest adversaries model, each node will strictly follow the protocol steps, but keep a record of all data he learns during the protocol to infer as much information about the other parties as possible. Beyond the semi-honest behaviors, several participants may collude, and the colluding nodes will share all information they learn to infer as much information about other legitimate users' private feedbacks as possible.
We also assume the communication channel between any two participants are secure, which can be realized by conventional cryptography.
Review and Discussion of StR Protocol
In [6] , Dimitriou and Michalas presented StR protocol to support decentralized reputation computation in the situation as our problem statement describes. After A q selects the set U and distributes it to each U i , StR consists of two rounds. First round aims at perturbing the private feedbacks, in which each U i generates a random number r i , splits it into n random shares: r i = r i1 + r i2 + · · · + r in , and sends r i j to U j ( j i). Then, U i sets the perturbed feedback as
. In second round, U i submits b i to A q , and A q can obtain the final aggregate feedback sum
It has been shown that if A q is uncompromised, the collusion of all the other (n − 1) nodes (U \ {U i }) cannot infer any information about the private feedback v i of U i , since each U j ( j i) only receives a random share of r i but nothing about v i . Furthermore, while the querying node A q is compromised, StR can resist the collusion of A q and at most k < (n − 1) feedback providers. Based on simulation experiments, [6] shows that StR is much more efficient than the previous scheme in [5] .
However, we observe many messages in StR offer no benefit to privacy-preservation. Through eliminating the redundant messages and the corresponding computation overheads, we can attain reduction in communication and computation cost, especially the communication delay can be decreased by about 50%. Next, we will further discuss StR.
Definition 1: (collusion-resistant degree)
In a secure reputation evaluation scheme f , for the private feedback v i of node U i , if the collusion of any t nodes (out of querying node A q and feedback providers apart from U i ) cannot infer v i , but there exists a collusion of (t + 1) nodes which can in- 
According to the above definition 1, we can obtain that the private feedback v i is secure against the collusion of at most d cr (v i ) nodes in the scheme f . The bigger d cr (v i ), the larger collusion v i can resist. In our problem statement, there are in total (n + 1) participants: one querying user and n feedback providers. Thus, the maximum value of d cr (v i ) is not bigger than n.
In StR [6] , the collusion of (U \ {U i }) can infer nothing about v i , and the collusion of A q and k < (n − 1) feedback providers also cannot get v i . That is, the collusion of any (n − 1) nodes cannot infer v i . Nevertheless, A q can figure out
Definition 2: (utility per message)
In a secure reputation evaluation scheme f , if m is total number of transmission messages of all the n feedback providers. Then, we define the utility per message (µ) as µ =
In the StR protocol [6] , each U i sends (n − 1) messages in first round and one message in second round, respectively. Then, the total number of messages is n * (n − 1 + 1) = n 2 . Hence, the utility per message of StR can be obtained µ =
n . We further discuss the utility of each message. As shown in Fig. 1(a) , if there is one message transmission between U i and U j (without loss of generality, we assume U i sends his random share r i j to U j ), then, U i and U j can use r i j to perturb their feedbacks, and any collusion that does not include U j (resp. U i ) cannot infer v i (resp. v j ) because of the randomness of r i j . Therefore, one message (r i j ) transmission can improve collusion-resistant degree of both v i and v j , compared to no message transmission between them. However, after r i j , the second random share r ji transmission can not enhance the collusion-resistant degree of any one, since the adversaries aiming at figuring out v i (resp. v j ) can simultaneously obtain r i j and r ji through corrupting U j (resp. U i ). Therefore, half of messages in first round of StR offer no benefit to the security. Through eliminating the useless messages transmission, Sect. 3 presents our new scheme which is as secure as StR, but achieves higher implementation efficiency than StR.
Our Scheme
This section presents a basic protocol: Secure Reputation Evaluation Protocol (SREP) and the enhanced version: Communication-balanced Secure Reputation Evaluation Protocol (CbSREP), both of which hold the same security with StR. Compared to StR, SREP nearly decreases communication overheads by 50%; through balancing communication load of nodes, CbSREP achieves about 50% reduction in communication delay.
Basic Protocol
In the first scheme, we avert the useless messages transmission by the rule: during perturbing the feedback (first round), U i (1 < i n) only sends his random shares to U j ( j < i), and U 1 sends nothing and only waits to receive the random shares destined to him. Then, each node uses the random numbers he sends and receives to perturb his sensitive feedback. In second round, U i directly uploads his blinded feedback to A q , and the querying user can obtain the aggregate reputation by summing n perturbed votes. The concrete steps are described in protocol 1.
Protocol 1 Secure Reputation Evaluation Protocol (SREP)
1: A q selects and distributes the set U = {U 1 , U 2 , · · · , U n }. 2: Round 1 -all the n feedback providers in parallel: 3: for all U i ∈ U do 4:
for all j < i do 6:
U i sends r i j to U j . 7: end for 8:
U i waits until he receives the random numbers from all U k (i < k n), and computes the perturbed feedback Proof: While A q is uncompromised, for the information about data of U i , the nodes of (U \ {U i }) can get nothing but the (i − 1) random numbers {r i1 , r i2 , · · · , r i,i−1 } throughout the protocol 1. Therefore, the collusion of (U \ {U i }) cannot deduce anything about the private vote v i of U i .
Theorem 2:
(Compromised A q ) In protocol 1, for any i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}, the collusion of A q and k < (n − 1) nodes out of (U \ {U i }) cannot infer v i .
Proof:
If A q is also compromised, we consider the collusion attack of A q and any k < (n − 1) nodes out of (U \ {U i }) as follows.
Without loss of generality, we assume the k colluding feedback providers does not include U j ∈ (U \ {U i }). Theorems 1 and 2 guarantee that protocol 1 is as secure as StR in [6] . For any i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}, collusion-resistant degree of v i in protocol 1 is also (n − 1), i.e., d cr (v i ) = n − 1, and U i sends (i − 1 + 1) messages in total. Then, the number of all messages in protocol is n(n+1) 2 and the utility per message of protocol 1 is µ =
2 )/n 2 ≈ 50% and (
Protocol 1 can decrease the communication overheads by 50% and nearly double the utility per message. Additionally, the nodes in our protocol totally generate
(i − 1) random numbers, which is about one half of n 2 in StR, and protocol 1 requires less computation cost.
Communication-balanced Protocol
As we have shown, our protocol 1 can decrease computation cost, and achieve about 50% reduction in communication overheads. While all feedback providers implement the scheme in parallel, the total time cost mainly depends on the most time-consuming node. In the above protocol, U n generates (n − 1) random numbers and sends (n − 1) messages in first round, which is almost the same as StR. Then, though protocol 1 reduces the overheads of other nodes, it cannot significantly mitigate the communication delay. In this sub-section, we further balance the messages transmission of the nodes, and present a new enhanced scheme to effectively reduce communication delay. Let n−1 2 be the smallest integer which is not less than n−1 2 . In our enhanced protocol, each U i selects n−1 2 random numbers and distributes them to the n−1 2 clockwise successor nodes shown in Fig. 2 . For each random number, the sender adds it to his blinded vote and the receiver subtracts it from his perturbed feedback, based on which the sum of perturbed votes will just equal to that of original ones. After completing the perturbation, A q will collect and 
